University of Mississippi

eGrove
Federal Publications

Accounting Archive

1934

National securities exchange bill, Senate 2693, Memorandum
submitted to the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency
George Oliver May

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/acct_fed
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons

Recommended Citation
May, George Oliver, "National securities exchange bill, Senate 2693, Memorandum submitted to the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency" (1934). Federal Publications. 319.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/acct_fed/319

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Accounting Archive at eGrove. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Federal Publications by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please
contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

THE NATIONAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE BILL
SENATE 2693
MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED TO THE
COMMITTEE O N

BANKING AND

SENATE

CURRENCY

In response to the request of the Chairman made
at the conclusion of my testimony before the Com
mittee on March 8, I submit a memorandum regarding
the suggestions which I then respectfully offered.
These suggestions were briefly as follows:
SECTION 1 2 :

( a ) Insert a provision enabling the regulating body
to dispense with the filing of quarterly statements
in any case or class of cases in which it might deem
such statement likely to be misleading or the filing
thereof undesirable for any other cause.
( b ) Limit the requirement of certified statements
to the filing annually of one balance sheet and one
statement of income and profit and loss for a full
year.
( c ) Make the provision regarding certified state
ments sufficiently flexible to permit of the distribu
tion of the auditing required so far as possible over
the year in such way as may be most desirable in the
general interest.
SECTION 1 7 :

Limit the liability under this section to cases in
which the issue of false or misleading statements is
shown to have been wilful.
NOTE: The provisions in this section regarding the measure of damage
seem open to criticism, but if the liability is limited to wilful
misstatement this point becomes of minor importance.

SECTION 1 8 :

Strike out Section 1 8 ( b ) , or amend it so as to limit
the authority of the Commission to the power to pre
scribe what information shall be set forth in balance
sheets and earnings statements.
Of these suggestions, that looking to the distribu
tion of audit work more evenly over the year is put
forward because on the basis of a long and wide ex
perience I am convinced that the adoption of this
simple proposal would add very greatly to the effici
ency of audits and enable them to be conducted at
lower cost and prove generally convenient to all those
who are concerned with the study of audited ac
counts after they have been issued. All the other
suggestions are inspired by a profound conviction of
the importance of recognizing in any such legisla
tion that accounts are not statements of fact, but
necessarily represent the results of the application of
accounting principles and judgment to facts.
The misconceptions on this point have been so wide
spread that it may be worth while to present an illus
tration which will emphasize the point I have made.
I take one from the field of motion pictures, which
has now become an important branch of industry.
The income of a motion picture producer is, of course,
derived mainly from rentals, and is largely dependent
on the cost of the picture and the length of its run.
In connection with the production of the picture
many stage properties are required which may or
may not be useful in other productions, so that the
cost may or may not be chargeable in total against
the picture for use in which they are purchased in
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the first instance. The studio will naturally have
large overhead expenses which must be apportioned
between the pictures which have been or are ex
pected to be produced during the year. Some prin
ciples have to be adopted for apportioning this over
head expense, and there is need for the exercise
of a considerable amount of judgment in applying the
principles and dealing with such expenditures as those
for stage properties.
Supposing the cost of the
picture to be satisfactorily determined—what propor
tion of this cost is to be charged against each dollar
of rental received?
In the early days, the simple rule was adopted that
all rentals were applied against the cost until the cost
was recovered, and thereafter all rentals were profits.
Obviously, such a result was conservative but quite
unscientific. If the picture as a whole produced a
profit, some part of each dollar of rental received
should be deemed to be profit. After careful research
it was discovered that the earnings of the ordinary
picture followed a more or less well-defined curve,
being naturally greatest in the early days of presenta
tion and gradually tapering off to zero at the end of,
perhaps, two years. Consequenty the practice became
general (and has been recognized by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue) of computing the income on the
basis of writing off the cost of the picture against the
rentals on the basis of such curves. Clearly, however,
there is even greater need for the exercise of judgment
in determining the precise shape of the curves to be
used, and naturally when this has been done the
experience of every picture will not conform to any
such curve, so that constant watchfulness and the
3

exercise of constant judgment is necessary to insure
proper statements of income.
The need for judgment in selecting and applying
accounting principles or conventions which I have
shown to be necessary in this case is necessary in
greater or less degree in almost every business—cer
tainly in every case in which either the exhaustion
of fixed property or the carrying of inventories is an
incident of the business. It is not true only of com
plex businesses. I chose for illustration on another
occasion the case of one of the unemployed who
engaged in the business of selling apples on the street
corner and continued in it for only four days, and
showed that the same situation (of course, on a small
scale) existed in that case.
There is no dispensing
with judgment
in the prepa
ration of accounts.
Obviously, those most intimately
associated with the business possess in the highest
degree the knowledge which is necessary for the exer
cise of judgment. But they are not disinterested. The
method of audited accounts which involves in the first
instance the preparation of accounts by the officers of
the company who are most familiar with its opera
tions, and the examination thereof by qualified inde
pendent accountants possessing a wide general knowl
edge of business and able to take a disinterested and
objective view of the position is, I believe, now gen
erally recognized as the best combination that has been
evolved for producing- satisfactory accounts.
In so far as principles of accounting are necessary
for the purpose, I think corporations should be allowed
to exercise judgment provided that they recognize cer
tain fundamental principles which are so well estab4

lished that they may fairly be given general applica
tion, and provided, also, that these principles are
definitely laid down and consistently followed. This
method of dealing with the problem, I note, has re
cently been recommended by the Twentieth Century
Fund as a result of its survey of the Stock Market
("Stock Market Control" by Evans Clark and others,
page 174). Care must, however, be taken to limit
the requirements of auditing so as to avoid making
them unduly burdensome on the corporations and the
investors therein.
With these general observations, I will proceed to
a discussion of the specific suggestions which I have
made.
SECTION 12: It follows from what I have said that
there is room for error or difference of opinion in
regard to the earnings of a business corporation for
any period, and, broadly speaking, the shorter
the
period the greater relatively
becomes the possible
mar
gin of error.
The extent thereof will vary with dif
ferent businesses; it will be wide in any case in which
inventories are large in proportion to profits, par
ticularly if the inventory consists mainly of com
modities which fluctuate in value. Thus monthly or
quarterly statements of earnings of a packing house
or a leather company are of little value and probably
as likely as not to be misleading unless accompanied
by very full explanations.
It is sometimes urged that such statements are at
least valuable because comparison with the corre
sponding period of a preceding year can usefully be
made. But unless much more than the bare results
5

are published, this will not necessarily be true. Innu
merable illustrations could be cited to demonstrate this
point. I will take only one—a comparison of the earn
ings of a corporation engaged in the sale at retail of
winter clothing for quarters ending in December and
March respectively with the corresponding figures for
the preceding year may be quite misleading if in one
year winter has come early and in the other, late, so
that in one case business was delayed until after Janu
ary 1 which in the other case matured in December.
I have always been opposed to the suggestion that
the New York Stock Exchange should make the publi
cation of quarterly statements a uniform requirement
for listing, and therefore I urge that power at least
should be given to the regulating body to waive such
a requirement in any case in which it believes that to
do so would best serve the public interest.
If quarterly statements are to be published, I feel
strongly that it is the duty of those who are seeking
to help the public to emphasize the fact that while
such statements may have value, that value is distinctly
limited. This, for two reasons—first, that as I have
already pointed out, allocations of profits to short
periods of time can only be approximate and arbi
trary; and, secondly, that the value of securities de
pends on the future, and that statements of past results
are valuable mainly as they afford an indication of the
reasonable expectations for the future, and profits for
a quarter or other short period are an entirely unsafe
basis on which to rest an estimate for the future.
The Committee is naturally anxious to do what it
can to put those possessing inside information and the
members of the general public as nearly as possible
6

on an equality in dealing in securities, but it is faced
with the insuperable obstacle that the advantage of
the insider rests upon the fact that he has knowledge
and qualifications for estimating the future which are
not possessed by and cannot possibly be extended to
the general public. His advantage is not that he
knows what the past earnings have been, but that he
can judge what future earnings are likely to be—
and no one would suggest that corporation executives
should be compelled by statute to prophesy.
To require that quarterly statements should be cer
tified by accountants would be to ascribe to them an
importance which they cannot possibly merit. This
is the principal reason which leads me to suggest
the elimination of this requirement from Section 12.
Other reasons are, that to require that quarterly state
ments should be audited before being published would
involve a substantial delay in the presentation of
figures which owe a large part of any value they
possess to their timeliness, and that it would involve a
very heavy burden of expense. I have no means of
estimating how great this burden of expense would
be, but it would certainly run to very large figures.
I should not regard this as a fatal objection, but I
should regard the expenditure as not merely wasted,
but as actually being devoted to an undesirable end.
I believe, however, that in this matter Congress has
an opportunity to take a very simple but very effective
step to improve present audit practice. The most serious
problem which the auditors of the accounts of listed
corporations have to face is that audits are required at
the close of the fiscal year, and that the great majority
of corporations end their fiscal year with the calendar
7

year, with the result that there is an enormous con
gestion of work in a few months. The existence of
this condition adds to the cost and detracts from the
efficiency of audits, and it could easily be avoided by a
simple provision such as I have proposed.
In many industries, December 31 is a most un
natural time for closing the accounts. In a few
instances, this fact has been recognized and another
closing date has been selected—thus the packing houses
generally close their accounts at the end of October.
But assumed convenience in income tax affairs and
similar considerations have led many corporations
to adopt the calendar year as their fiscal year, al
though accounts for a period ending at some other
date would be more informative. The natural closing
date for automobile and tire companies would be
September 30 or October 31. Formerly all the rail
roads closed their accounts at June 30. A discre
tionary provision such as I have suggested would
admit of the work of auditing being distributed more
equally over the entire year, thus not only reducing
the cost and increasing the efficiency of audits, but
contributing to the convenience of the exchanges and
regulating bodies, and others who are called upon
to scrutinize audited accounts when issued. I recog
nize that in the past audits of corporations other than
financial institutions have usually been made at the
close of the calendar year, but any inconvenience that
might result from a change in this respect would be
trivial in comparison with the advantages to be
derived from a better distribution of the work of
auditing over the entire year. Of course, the require
ment of quarterly audits as proposed in the bill would
8

itself result in the equal distribution of work over the
year which I regard as so desirable, but only at an
undue expense to the corporation and the investors
therein.
SECTION 1 7 :

I urge that the liabilities imposed by Section 1 7
should be limited to cases in which the issue of false or
misleading statements is shown to be wilful, because
I am convinced that it is contrary to the public in
terest to impose such liabilities for honest error, either
of fact or of judgment. Particularly is this true in
respect of statements which are so largely matters of
judgment as quarterly statements of profits. It is no
torious that sometimes the most truthful statement
may be the most misleading because of the unwar
ranted inferences to which it gives rise.
In the long run, the main part of the financial bur
den imposed by this section will fall upon the cor
poration—that is upon the investors, whereas the
benefits thereof would accrue mainly to speculators,
and I do not believe it is wise to place burdens on
investors for the benefit of speculators.
The provisions of the section relating to the measure
of damages seem to me to be open to serious objection
because, as has already been pointed out to your Com
mittee, they would enable damages to be recovered
which would bear no relation to the damage actually
suffered, and this seems to me to be a vicious prin
ciple, particularly if it is to be applied to cases of
honest error, either of fact or of judgment. If the
section is limited to cases of wilful misrepresentation,
I do not suppose anyone would be concerned over a
possible undue liberality in the measure of damages.
9

SECTION 1 8 :

I now turn to Section 18 ( b ) , which confers on the
regulating body not only the power to prescribe the
form in which accounts shall be presented, but how
profits shall be computed.
I have said, and it cannot be too often repeated, that
accounts necessarily represent the result of the applica
tion of appropriate accounting principles and judg
ment to facts. Upon the soundness of the judgment
employed first in choosing and then in applying the
guiding principles depends the value of the resulting
accounts. Sound judgment can be based only on inti
mate knowledge and ample experience, and its exer
cise should be attended with responsibility. I believe
the provision is unwise in so far as the sub-section
would vest the right to exercise this judgment in a
commission which would have no responsibility, legal
or moral, for the consequences that might ensue, and
would necessarily lay down general rules which might
or might not fit the specific cases to which they would
have to be applied. I recognize that similar powers
have been vested in the Interstate Commerce Com
mission and other bodies; but while our theories of
rate regulation probably necessitated some such pro
cedure in the case of railroads and other public
utilities, the results are to my mind none the less
unfortunate because they may have been inevitable.
In the first place, the idea that uniformity can be
attained and the exercise of discretion rendered unnec
essary by rules, however detailed, is entirely illusory.
Today, after more than a quarter of a century of
intensive development of the accounting classifications
of the Interstate Commerce Commission, it is still pos10

sible to produce widely different accounting results
from a slight difference in the form of treatment of
substantially identical transactions. Moreover, under
those classifications, while manuals running to hun
dreds of pages exist in which the treatment of innu
merable items large and small is prescribed in metic
ulous detail, it is still necessary to allow the railroads
to determine the monthly charges to many important
operating accounts on the basis of budget estimates of
future expenditures. In respect of other important
elements, such as depreciation, the practice of regu
lated companies still varies widely. Meantime, the
uninformed public assumes a uniformity and a com
parability between accounts of different railroads and
utilities which does not exist and can never be attained.
In the second place, uniformity necessarily means
a uniformly low standard—indeed, laws can do no
more than lay down minimum standards; higher stand
ards can come only as the result of the recognition of
ethical and moral obligations. The accounting stand
ards of the majority of industrial corporations with
which I am acquainted are distinctly more conserva
tive than those of regulated corporations.
In 1932, a committee of the American Institute of
Accountants, as a result of a study of the general
question, rendered a report, a copy of which was put
in evidence before the Senate Committee by the chair
man of the Committee on Stock List of The New
York Stock Exchange on January 12, 1933. In that
report, the Committee recommended to the Exchange,
inter alia, to use its influence—
"To make universal the acceptance by listed
corporations of certain broad principles of ac
counting which have won fairly general accept11

ance, and within the limits of such broad prin
ciples to make no attempt to restrict the right of
corporations to select detailed methods of account
ing deemed by them to be best adapted to the re
quirements of their business; but—
( a ) To ask each listed corporation to cause a
statement of the methods of accounting and re
porting employed by it to be formulated in suf
ficient detail to be a guide to its accounting de
partment; to have such statement adopted by its
board so as to be binding on its accounting officers;
and to furnish such statement to the Exchange
and make it available to any stockholder on re
quest and upon payment, if desired, of a reasonable
fee.
( b ) To secure assurances that the methods so
formulated will be followed consistently from
year to year and that if any change is made in the
principles or any material change in the manner of
application, the stockholders and the Exchange
shall be advised when the first accounts are pre
sented in which effect is given to such change.
( c ) To endeavor to bring about a change in
the form of audit certificate so that the auditors
would specifically report to the shareholders
whether the accounts as presented were properly
prepared in accordance with the methods of ac
counting regularly employed by the company, de
fined as already indicated."
I believe that this method of approach to the
problem would prove more practically effective than
an attempt to institute uniform accounting. I under
stand, however, that the Department of Commerce
is at the present time conducting a study into the
whole question of uniform accounting and uniform
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statistics. Legislation on the subject does not seem
to me to form an essential part of a law the primary
purpose of which is the regulation of stock exchanges
and stock exchange practices, and I would urge that
Sub-section 1 8 (b) should be eliminated and the whole
question dealt with on its merits in the light of full
information such as I trust will be developed through
the inquiry to which I have referred.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE O. MAY,
Price, Waterhouse & Co.,
56 Pine Street,
New York, N. Y.

March 10, 1934.
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